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“The Constitution doesn't belong to a bunch of judges and
lawyers. It belongs to you.”
–United States Supreme Court Justice Anthony
Kennedy2
I. INTRODUCTION
It is not enough to have a vote. Citizens need a meaningful voice.
The democratic process is broken.

This article argues that our

*
Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana Tech Law School; B.A., magna cum laude, University of
Southern California; J.D., with honors, Ohio State University College of Law, LL.M, New York
University School of Law.
1
This Essay is part one in a two-part series, and a broad introduction that focuses on merging the
written and unwritten Constitution into a unified theory that promotes an equal and participatory
democracy.
2
ACADEMY OF ACHIEVEMENT, INTERVIEW: ANTHONY KENNEDY JUSTICE OF THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT (2010) [hereinafter Justice Kennedy Interview], http://www.achievement.org/autodoc/print
member/ken0int-1.
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constitutional democracy is in disequilibrium, and plagued by inequality and
unfairness. The current imbalance favors centralized governance, wealth,
and courts that rely too often on subjective values rather than constitutional
constraints.
The Supreme Court’s opinions in Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission3 and McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission4
more firmly entrenched inequality in democracy. Corporations and wealthy
individuals can now contribute millions to political candidates and influence
both the electoral and legislative process.5 Second, the Court’s individual
rights jurisprudence has often removed divisive policy questions from public
and legislative debate, resulting in a top-down federalism that undermines
meaningful citizen participation in democracy.6 Indeed, all but the
wealthiest citizens lack political power, and their votes at the ballot box are
more symbolic than real. Absent equal participation in and access to the
political and democratic process, democracy is little more than a caricature
of itself.
Solving the democracy problem transcends debates about
constitutional interpretation.
It suffices to say that, although the
Constitution is written,7 it certainly contains unwritten values such as
liberty, privacy, and equality.8 Some words in the text are “dead,” 9 in that
they establish a decentralized structure of governance and enumerate
inalienable rights, while others are “evolving” 10 because the words are
ambiguous. For example, our understanding of whether bail is “excessive,”
or punishment “cruel and unusual,” depends to some extent on
contemporary standards and values, or on what the Court calls “evolving

3

558 U.S. 310 (2010).
134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
5
See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, What Should Citizens (As Participants in a Republican Form of
Government) Know About the Constitution, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1239, 1253 (2009) (quoting
Senator John McCain during the 2008 general election, who told visitors to his website that
“Washington’s broken”); see generally Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of
Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 CAL. L. REV. 273 (2011); James A. Gardner, Democracy
Without a Net? Separation of Powers and the Idea of Self-Sustaining Constitutional Constraints on
Undemocratic Behavior, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 293, 295 (2005) (arguing that “the U.S. Constitution’s
structural backup systems have never worked as originally contemplated, and a significant reason is that
democratic institutional norms, and the associated modalities of democratic politics, have crowded out
the behavior on which the stability of such structural systems by design depends”).
6
STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 5 (2005);
see also Michael W. McConnell, Active Liberty: A Progressive Alternative to Textualism and
Originalism?, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2391 (2006).
7
See, e.g., Bernadette Meyler, Daniel Defoe and The Written Constitution, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 73
(2008).
8
See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND
PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY (2012).
9
See Michael C. Dorf, The Constitution and the Political Community, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 499,
505 (2011).
10
See James E. Fleming, Living Originalism and Living Constitutionalism as Moral Readings of the
American Constitution, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1171, 1172 (2012).
4
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standards of decency.”11
Additionally, it does no good to label judges as activists, 12 or as
“legislating from the bench,”13 which is a phrase that Justice Anthony
Kennedy aptly refers to as “a decision you don't like.”14 Indeed, after
Clinton v. City of New York, 15 Bush v. Gore, 16 Citizens United,
McCutcheon, and Shelby County v. Holder,17 which, except for Clinton,
were decided by five-member conservative majorities, it became apparent
that the problem is not with particular justices or ideologies. In Clinton, for
example, the Court thwarted Congress’s attempt to curb out-of-control
spending at the federal level, and in Bush stopped the State of Florida from
resolving its electoral dispute.18 In McCutcheon, the Court relied on the
First Amendment to invalidate aggregate limits on individual contributions
without adequately addressing the concern that allowing wealthy individuals
to contribute millions to political candidates effectively silences the speech
of millions. In short, across the ideological spectrum, the Court’s decisions
have undermined the coordinate branches’ attempts to equalize the
democratic and political process, and given more power to nine unelected
members of the federal judiciary.
Likewise, in its individual rights jurisprudence the Court has often
manipulated the Constitution to achieve desired policy outcomes. For
example, Griswold v. Connecticut19 and Roe v. Wade20 were predicated on
implied guarantees and constitutional penumbras that represented an
unprecedented expansion of judicial power. In these cases, the Court’s
“undisciplined discretion”21 removed issues concerning unenumerated rights
11

Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (“The Amendment must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”).
12
See e.g., Robert Justin Lipkin, We are all Judicial Activists now, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 181, 182
(2008).
13
See Bruce G. Peabody, Legislating from the Bench: A Definition and Defense, 11 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 185, 188 (2007).
14
Matt Sedensky, Justice Questions way Court Nominees are Grilled, ASSOCIATED PRESS ALERT
(Cal.), May 14, 2010 (quoting Justice Anthony Kennedy).
15
524 U.S. 417 (1998).
16
531 U.S. 98 (2000).
17
133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
18
Ezra Klein, Will Be Hard, BALLOON JUICE (June 22, 2012), http://www.balloon-juice.com/2012/
06/22/will-be-hard/ (interview with Professor Amar). Reflecting on this decision, Yale law professor
Akhil Amar stated:
I’ve only mispredicted one big Supreme Court case in the last 20 years, . . . [t]hat
was Bush v. Gore. And I was able to internalize that by saying they only had a
few minutes to think about it and they leapt to the wrong conclusion. If they
decide this by 5-4, then yes, it’s disheartening to me, because my life was a fraud.
Here I was, in my silly little office, thinking law mattered, and it really didn’t.
What mattered was politics, money, party, and party loyalty.
Id.
19
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
20
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
21
Nelson Lund & John O. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102 MICH. L. REV.
1555, 1575–81 (2004) (discussing Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Lawrence, Lund states that “[i]t is hard
to think of a more ad hoc and manipulable basis for interpreting the United States Constitution, and the
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from public discourse, and prevented the people from resolving these issues
through democratic means.22 Unfortunately, without empowered citizens,
democracy becomes as much a fiction as substantive due process.23
In both areas, the Court’s reasoning is the product of inconsistent,
dishonest, and undemocratic judging. In Clinton, the Court relied on the
Constitution’s “finely wrought procedures” 24 to invalidate the Line Item
Veto Act and block the coordinate branches’ attempt to curb excessive
spending, but in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey25 it affirmed Roe’s central holding based on the “right to define one’s
own concept of existence . . . and the mystery of human life.”26 In Citizens
United, the Court relied on the First Amendment’s protection of political
speech to invalidate laws that limited corporate campaign contributions,27
but in Lawrence v. Texas28 embraced liberty “in its spatial and more
transcendent dimensions”29 to strike a Texas statute outlawing sodomy.
Liberty, however, is an elusive term upon which “the ablest and purest men
have differed.”30 That counsels for restraint and resolution of these issues
through the democratic process. Ultimately, the outcomes in these cases did
not enhance equal participation in democracy; they have enhanced judicial
power at the expense of democracy.
Justice Kennedy correctly explains the “[t]he essence of democracy
is that the right to make law rests in the people and flows to the government,
not the other way around.”31 Currently, however, we are currently residing
in an “other way around” world where the judiciary often imposes empyrean
understandings of liberty and ventures into the jurisprudential world of
make-believe otherwise known as substantive due process.32 In Roe and
use of foreign decisions to bolster substantive due process is yet another example of the way Lawrence
maximizes and reflects the Court’s now completely undisciplined discretion”).
22
See John Tuskey, Do as We say and not (Necessarily) as We do: The Constitution, Federalism,
and the Supreme Court’s Exercise of Judicial Power, 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 153, 176 (2005) (“[S]aying
what the law is (as defined by the law’s actual content) is not the same as saying what the law ought to
be.”).
23
See generally Anthony B. Sanders, The New “Judicial Federalism” Before Its Time: A
Comprehensive Review of Economic Substantive Due Process Under State Constitutional Law Since
1940 and the Reasons for Its Recent Decline, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 457 (discussing the early mid-twentieth
century evolution of economic substantive due process).
24
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 447 (1998) (citation omitted).
25
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
26
Id. at 851.
27
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010).
28
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
29
Id. at 562; see also Edward Whelan, The Meta-Nonsense of Lawrence, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET
PART 133, 134 (2006) (criticizing Lawrence and stating, “[w]hy aren't nudists equally entitled to define
the concept of their own existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life?”).
30
Lund & McGinnis, supra note 21, at 1591 (explaining that, with respect to the term ‘liberty,’ “the
ablest and purest men have differed on the subject; and all that the Court could properly say . . . would
be, that the Legislature (possessed of an equal right of opinion) had passed an act which, in the opinion of
the judges, was inconsistent with [certain] abstract principles . . . .”) (internal citation omitted).
31
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2675 (2013) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
32
U.S. Const. amend. XIV provides as follows:
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Citizens United, the Court established uniform policies on the entire country
instead of allowing each state to disagree—and to be different.
Citizens—not “a bunch of judges and lawyers,”33—have the
constitutional right to “define [their] own concept of existence, of meaning,
of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”34 The people—not
Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, Stephen Breyer, or Sonya
Sotomayor—have the sole authority to unearth the heart of liberty “both in
its spatial and in its more transcendent dimensions.”35 Citizens, not the
Supreme Court, have the freedom to “invoke [the Constitution’s] principles
in their own search for greater freedom.”36 Moreover, just as “beliefs about
. . . the attributes of personhood”37 should not be “formed under [the]
compulsion of the State,”38 they should not result from decisions that
substitute subjective values for constitutional analysis.39 Liberty and
equality are not achieved merely through good policy outcomes; they
require direct and meaningful participation in the processes by which those
policies are adopted.40 For most citizens the “political liberty to direct the
governmental process to make decisions that might be wrong in the ideal
sense, subject to correction in the ordinary political process,”41 has been

No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
The Court has held, however, that the Fourteenth Amendment also guarantees substantive liberty
interests, not merely procedural fairness. Scholars have criticized substantive due process as a nonsequitur that is akin to the phrase “green pastel redness” and fundamentally undemocratic). See, e.g.,
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 18 (1980); see also Amy McCamphill, Note, More Bitter
than Sweet: A Procedural Due Process Critique of Certification Periods, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 138, 161
(2009); Randy E. Barnett, Who’s Afraid of Unenumerated Rights?, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 11–12 (2006)
(judges “have no particular expertise to identify fundamental rights, the content of which is not provided
to them by an authoritative source”).
33
Justice Kennedy Interview, supra note 2.
34
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992); see also,
Whelan, supra note 29, at 133 (“Nowhere is there evident awareness that the Supreme Court's decisionmaking cannot properly consist of unfettered moral philosophizing but must instead take account of the
Court's role within a governmental system of separated powers and federalism.”).
35
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
36
Id. at 579.
37
Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 851.
38
Id.
39
See Laurence Tribe, Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 7 (1973).
40
See Richard W. Murphy, Separation of Powers and the Horizontal Force of Precedent, 78 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1075, 1081 n.29 (2003). Professor Murphy explains as follows:
Some contend that stare decisis is too fuzzy and easily manipulated by judges to
carry much real force--especially at the Supreme Court level. It is certainly true
that one cannot take judicial discussions of stare decisis at face value--for one
thing, given the complexity of cognitive processes that occur in judicial (and other)
brains, it is safe to hazard that judges themselves do not understand the full effects
of stare decisis on their decisions.
Id.
41
Anthony Kennedy, Address to the Canadian Institute for Advanced Legal Studies at Stanford
University: Unenumerated Rights and the Dictates of Judicial Restraint 14 (July 24–Aug. 1, 1986)
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compromised.
This brief essay argues that the establishment of a thriving
democracy depends on: (1) deference to legislation that addresses inequality
and inefficiency in governance; and (2) caution when resolving policy issues
upon which the Constitution is silent or ambiguous. Indeed, in United
States v. Carolene Products,42 the Court suggested that “[t]here may be
narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the
Constitution . . . .”43 That was a call for restraint, not activism, and for
democracy, not oligarchy.
The Court has begun to shift in a more democratic direction. In
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius44, Chief Justice
Roberts wrote in the majority opinion that “‘[p]roper respect for a
coordinate branch of the government’ requires that we strike down an Act of
Congress only if ‘the lack of constitutional authority to pass [the] act in
question is clearly demonstrated.’”45 Additionally, the Court’s prodemocracy decision in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action,46
which upheld a voter-enacted ban on race-conscious admissions policies at
public universities, suggests that the Court is allowing bottom-up
lawmaking to replace top-down governance.
As Justice Kennedy has stated, “we must never lose sight of the fact
that the law has a moral foundation, and we must never fail to ask ourselves
not only what the law is, but what the law should be.”47 He is right. The
“we” is the people, not the Court, and the “should” belongs to citizens and
their elected representatives. The Constitution does have penumbras,48 and
they are vital to a free society, but it has words too, and they matter. The
Court can enhance democracy by enforcing the “common mandate[s] rooted
in the Constitution[,]”49 not by frustrating the choices of citizens and
institutions with whom they may disagree. To be clear, an evolving
constitution has a place in constitutional jurisprudence. But evolution is
different from creationism.
Part II analyzes recent precedent in the areas of governance and
individual rights and argues that living constitutionalism and originalism can
both enhance democracy depending on the constitutional issues to which
(transcript
available
at
http://joshblackman.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Kennedy.Unenumerated-Rights-speech-1986-1.pdf).
42
304 U.S. 144 (1938).
43
Id. at 152 n.4.
44
132 S. Ct. 2566, 2579 (2012).
45
Id. at 2579 (citation omitted).
46
134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
47
Richard C. Reuben, Man in the Middle, CAL. LAW., Oct. 1992, at 35.
48
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
49
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992).
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they are applied. Part III discusses the Court’s recent decision regarding
same-sex marriage and argues for a new approach when marriage equality
next comes before the Court.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL EQUILIBRIUM AND THE SUPREME COURT
Restoring constitutional equilibrium is not synonymous with the
political process doctrine that the Court has developed in connection with its
equal protection jurisprudence.50 That doctrine prevents states from
“alter[ing] the procedures of government to target racial minorities”51 such
that it places a “special burden on racial minorities [to affect change] within
the governmental process.”52 This article focuses more on allowing citizens
the authority to decide issues policy issues where the Constitution is silent
or its words are ambiguous. Giving courts that power may lead to good
results, but it also centralizes power and federalizes democracy.
A. Get Over It: Marbury and the Ninth Amendment Do Not Empower the
Judiciary to Create Extra-Constitutional Rights
Neither the Ninth Amendment, nor Marbury v. Madison, justifies
placing the Court at the top of the constitutional hierarchy. To begin with,
“[r]ecently uncovered historical evidence . . . suggests that those who
framed and ratified the Ninth Amendment understood it as a guardian of the
retained right to local self-government.”53 The Ninth Amendment is “a
reminder that the people retain all their rights against the federal
government—including the right to govern themselves as they see fit within
their own states . . . .”54 Professors Nelson Lund and John McGinnis explain
as follows:
The Ninth Amendment by its terms is a rule of construction
rather than a substantive guarantee of rights. It simply
warns against misinterpreting the Constitution to mean that
the enumeration of certain rights might authorize the federal
government to infringe other rights. It is thus a reminder
that the people retain all their rights . . . including the right
to govern themselves as they see fit within their own
50
See, e.g., Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392 (1969) (invalidating a voter-approved
amendment to the city charter requiring that all anti-discrimination laws be passed through the
referendum process); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380–81 (1967) (invalidating an amendment to
the California Constitution that prohibited the state from interfering with an owner’s decision to refuse to
sell residential property, regardless of the reason); Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, 458 U.S.
457, 487 (1982) (invalidating a state initiative that prohibited busing as a means by which to desegregate
schools).
51
Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1632 (2014).
52
Id.
53
Kurt T. Lash, The Inescapable Federalism of the Ninth Amendment, 93 IOWA L. REV. 801, 801
(2008).
54
Lund & McGinnis, supra note 21, at 1592.
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states—except to the extent that the federal government is
authorized to infringe those rights in the exercise of its
enumerated powers.55
Furthermore, Professor Randy Barnett explains that “judges should do only
what they are qualified to do and that is to enforce ‘the rule laid down.’ . . .
The process of identifying the content of unenumerated rights appears to be
indistinguishable as a practical matter from adopting a judge’s personal
preferences.”56
Likewise, “the underlying intent of the [Marbury] opinion was to set
forth a principled statement of the judiciary's place in the American
constitutional system that disavowed any political role for courts and
judges.”57 Judge William H. Pryor explains as follows:
Marbury is occasionally described as the event where
allegedly Americans invented judicial review, but that
notion is so untrue as to be laughable. Marbury is routinely
cited as supporting judicial supremacy, but it does nothing
of the sort. Marbury is also celebrated as a triumph of
judicial activism, but that proposition too is false. In fact,
Marbury v. Madison is an example of judicial restraint.58
In fact, “[m]odern scholarship establishes that Marbury is a victim of
historical revisionism.”59
Of course, laws that facially violate the Constitution’s text, whether
they strive to eviscerate fundamental rights,60 draw arbitrary classifications,
or create inequality in the democratic process, should be invalidated.61 The
Court should defer, however, to legislation that seeks to equalize the
political process, address inefficiencies in the legislative process, or resolve
divisive policy issues upon which the Constitution is silent or ambiguous.
Some of the Court’s recent decisions, however, have done the opposite.

55
56
57

Id.
Barnett, supra note 32, at 11–12.
CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE RULE OF LAW 49

(1996).
58

William H. Pryor, Jr., The Unbearable Rightness of Marbury v. Madison: It’s Real Lessons and
Irrepressible Myths, 12 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC'YS PRAC. GROUPS 94, 94 (2011).
59
Id.
60
In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the Court held that indigent criminal defendants
have a right to publicly funded counsel. In the post-Gideon years, however, many public defender
systems at the state level remain underfunded, and fail to provide meaningful assistance to indigent
criminal defendants. See generally Emily Chiang, Indigent Defense Invigorated: A Uniform Standard for
Adjudicating Pre-Conviction Sixth Amendment Claims, 19 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 443 (2010).
61
See e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (properly invalidating a statute that
invalidated sodomy only among same-sex couples).
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B Equilibrium in the Political-Legislative Sphere: Where A Living
Constitution Facilitates a Robust Democracy
If living constitutionalism has a place in the Court’s jurisprudence,
it is in those cases involving legislation that seeks to cure inefficiency and
inequality in government processes. Indeed, it is difficult to believe that the
Framers would have insisted on strict adherence to the Constitution’s text if
it would cause an epidemic of gridlock and partisan chicanery. As one
commentator noted, “[w]hy should [the Founders] decisions prevent the
people of today from governing ourselves as we see fit?”62 The Framers
might have expected that the coordinate branches should have the flexibility
to address contemporary—and unforeseeable—problems relating to
efficiency in the lawmaking process. The Court should, therefore, review
statutes in this area by emphasizing the “unwritten”63 rules of a “living”64
Constitution, and deferring to legislation that helps to make the political
process more efficient and fair.
1. Clinton v. City of New York
In Clinton, the Supreme Court held that 2 U.S.C.A. §692(a)(1),
which authorized the line item veto (the “Act”), violated the Constitution’s
Presentment Clause.65 The Act was passed by both houses of Congress—
and signed by the President—to help balance the federal budget.66 It gave
the President authority to veto or “cancel” three discreet types of spending
that were previously signed into law.67 Before cancelling any duly-enacted
spending provision, however, the President was required to consider
legislative history, other relevant information, and determine that all
cancellations had the effect of reducing the Federal Budget Deficit.68 A
“lockbox” provision in the statute provided that monies saved from a
cancellation could not be spent elsewhere.69 Congress also had the authority
to issue a “disapproval bill”70 that would render any veto “null and void.”71
The Court found the Act unconstitutional under Article 1, section 7
(the Presentment Clause), with Justice Kennedy writing separately to argue

62

Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and Democratic Legitimacy: Textualism and the Dead Hand
of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1127, 1127 (1998).
63
See Akhil Reed Amar, American Constitutionalism – Written, Unwritten, and Living, 126 HARV.
L. REV. F. 195, 203 (2013) (“Though holistic between-the-lines meaning is in some sense unwritten—it
transcends the literal meaning of each word or clause read in isolation—it is a pervasive part of proper
constitutionalism, I argue.”).
64
See Fleming, supra note 10, at 1171–74.
65
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448-49 (1998).
66
Id. at 448.
67
Id. at 436.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 440–41.
70
Id. at 436 (citation omitted).
71
Id. (citation omitted).
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that the Act violated the non-delegation doctrine.72 The majority expressed
“no opinion about the wisdom of the Act’s procedures”73 but did recognize
that “both major political parties . . . in the Legislative and the Executive
Branches have long advocated for the enactment of such procedures”74 to
ensure fiscal accountability. The Court nonetheless found the Act
unconstitutional because, in its view, the line item veto empowered the
President to create “a different law”75 than the one he initially signed. 76 As
a result, the line item veto did not comply with the “finely wrought”
procedure commanded by the Constitution.”77
Justice Kennedy concurred, explaining that “concentration of power
in the hands of a single branch is a threat to liberty”78 and therefore
“transcends the convenience of the moment.”79 In Justice Kennedy’s view,
“[f]ailure of political will does not justify unconstitutional remedies[,]”80
because “[t]he individual loses liberty in a real sense”81 if one branch is “not
subject to traditional constitutional constraints.”82 That principle also
applies to the Supreme Court, particularly since the Court’s members are not
elected and largely unaccountable.
Justice Breyer dissented, and joined by Justices O’Connor and
Scalia argued that “the Line Item Veto Act (Act) does not violate any
specific textual constitutional command, nor does it violate any implicit
separation-of-powers principle.”83 Justice Breyer recognized that the
Framers never intended to prohibit the executive and legislative branches
from implementing solutions that addressed current problems:
To have prescribed the means by which government should,
in all future time, execute its powers, would have been to
change, entirely, the character of the instrument, and give it
the properties of a legal code. It would have been an
unwise attempt to provide, by immutable rules, for
exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must have been seen
dimly, and which can be best provided for as they occur.84
Justice Breyer emphasized the “genius of the Framers' pragmatic vision,
which this Court has long recognized in cases that find constitutional room
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84

Id. at 447–48; id. at 450–51 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 447 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id. at 448.
Id.
Id. at 447 (citation omitted).
Id. at 450 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 449.
Id.
Id. at 451.
Id.
Id. at 469–70 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 472 (citation omitted).
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for necessary institutional innovation.”85
Clinton is a perfect example of judging that hinders effective
governance. The majority and Justice Kennedy thwarted an important
compromise that the coordinate branches deemed necessary to combat
excessive government spending. The line item veto made the government
operate more efficiently, and a “[f]ailure of political will,”86 is precisely why
the Court should have deferred to the coordinate branches’ remedy. Put
differently, if pervasive national problems cannot be fixed through
conventional legislative processes, the coordinate branches should be
allowed to experiment with innovative reforms.
Indeed, the line item veto reflected practical realities, including
party polarization, which had for years made the spending problem worse.
Both Congress and the President were uniquely suited to assess this
problem, and it is highly unlikely that the founders would have denied them
this flexibility. Furthermore, the failure to comply with a “finely wrought”87
procedure, or satisfy Justice Kennedy’s theoretical notions of liberty,
seemed bizarre considering that, five years later, his majority opinion in
Lawrence had little regard for the Constitution’s finely worded text.
The majority also gave no credence to the inherent checks within
the executive and legislative branches to protect against a “[c]oncentration
of power.”88 The line item veto did not vest the President with uncontrolled
or unchecked power, because Congress retained the authority to disapprove
all cancellations. Furthermore, it is implausible, if not absurd, that Congress
would delegate powers to the executive branch if it believed that its
lawmaking function would be compromised. One branch does not surrender
power unless it provides a tangible benefit that, far from being inimical to
either institution, provides a structure by which each one can operate more
effectively. If anything, by finding a reasonable compromise, the Act
served the political interests of each branch and the people to whom
politicians must answer.
Democracy and liberty are enhanced when problems affecting the
parties’ constituents are dealt with in ways that affect positive change. The
majority’s decision, along with Justice Kennedy’s version of liberty, made
our political institutions less functional and the people less free.
2. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission
In Citizens United, the Court struck down section 441(b) of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”), which prohibited
85
86
87
88
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corporations and unions from using general treasury funds that “expressly
advocates the election or defeat of a candidate . . . and is publicly distributed
. . . within 30 days of a primary election.”89 The BCRA was challenged on
the grounds that the limitations on corporate and union contributions, which
applied to direct or individual expenditures (electioneering
communications), violated the First Amendment.90
The lower courts denied relief, based in part on the Court’s prior
holding in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission,91 which upheld
against a facial challenge limits on electioneering communications.92 The
Court overruled McConnell, finding that section 441(b) constituted an
“outright ban”93 on corporate speech and fell within the “classic examples of
censorship.”94 In the majority’s view, section 441(b) “necessarily reduces
the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed . . .
and the size of the audience reached.”95 This allowed the government to
suppress speech by “silencing certain voices [that the government deems to
be suspect] at any of the various points in the speech process.”96 Thus,
because the First Amendment applied to corporations,97 section 441(b)’s
limits on electioneering infringed upon core political speech, or what the
Court called an “essential mechanism of democracy[.]”98
Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that the majority’s decision
prevented lawmakers from enforcing “regulatory distinctions”99 that have a
“compelling constitutional basis[.]”100 In Justice Stevens’ view, legislators
have an obligation, “if not also a democratic duty, to take measures designed
to guard against the potentially deleterious effects of corporate spending in
local and national races.”101 Justice Stevens explained that “[t]he financial
resources, legal structure, and instrumental orientation”102 of corporations
differentiate them from human speakers and “may conflict in fundamental
respects with the interests of eligible voters.”103 Thus, despite “legitimate

89
2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A) (2006) (the statute also prohibited expenditures within sixty days of a
general election).
90
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 318–19, 330 (2010).
91
540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365–66; see also Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 655 (1990) (holding that political speech may be
banned based on a person’s corporate identity).
92
See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 199–213.
93
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 337.
94
Id. (Congress’s decision to exempt Political Action Committees from the statute did not, in the
majority’s view, save the statute’s constitutionality).
95
Id. at 339 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976)) (per curiam)).
96
Id.
97
Id. at 342.
98
Id. at 339.
99
Id. at 394 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
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concerns about their role in the electoral process[,]”104 the majority’s
decision permitted “corporations and unions . . . to spend as much general
treasury money as they wish on ads that support or attack [political]
candidates[.]”105 This “dramatically enhances the role of corporations and
unions—and the narrow interests they represent . . . in determining who will
hold public office.”106
As in Clinton, the majority’s decision barred the legislative and
executive branches from taking constructive steps to give individual citizens
a more influential voice in the political process. The connection between
money, access, and power is difficult to dispute, and section 404(b)’s limits
commendably sought to fix pervasive inequalities in our political system.
The Court’s decision stopped the coordinate branches from fixing a glaring
weakness in the electoral process, and Justice Kennedy’s sweeping rhetoric
about liberty ensured that money—not ideas—would retain primacy in our
political system. Citizens United was an undemocratic decision and
prohibited a more accessible system of democratic governance. Likewise,
in McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission,107 the Court—by a 5-4
margin—invalidated a statute that set aggregate limits individual campaign
contributions.108 As a result, corporations and wealthy individuals will
continue to enjoy access and influence in the political process, while
ordinary individuals might stay at home on election day.
In both Citizens United and McCutcheon, nothing in the First
Amendment categorically prohibited the legislative and executive branches
from establishing these limits. Of course, while the First Amendment
protects political speech, particularly speech that is unpopular or distasteful,
it does not imply that money is speech, or that reasonable limits on
corporate and individual contributions is impermissible. This is particularly
true where the limits are designed to curb corruption and inequality in the
electoral and democratic process. These decisions are particularly troubling
because the Court has previously recognized that “[c]orporate wealth can
unfairly influence elections[.]”109
The Court’s reluctance to do so is surprising given that it has been
more than willing to divine “penumbras”110 from the Constitution and to
discover fundamental rights that have questionable, if not non-existent,
support from either the written or unwritten text.111 If the Court is willing to
104
Id. (citing FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 209 (1982)) (upholding prior
restrictions on corporate campaign spending).
105
Id. at 412.
106
Id.
107
134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
108
Id. at 1461–62.
109
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990).
110
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
111
Id.
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embrace a “living constitution” in that context, then it should, at the very
least, embrace a living constitution when our executive and legislative
branches enact laws enhancing the efficiency and fairness of our political
process. In two recent cases, however, it appears that the Court might be
adopting such an approach.
3. National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius
The winds are beginning to blow in a more democratic direction. In
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,112 Chief Justice
John Roberts’ majority opinion, upholding a critical provision of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Health Care Act (the “Act”),113 recognized that
the Court’s role as a co-equal institution warranted a more restrained
approach.114 The Act was intended to increase the number of Americans
covered by health care and decrease overall health care costs.115 To
accomplish this, Congress enacted a controversial “individual mandate[,]”116
which required people (who were not exempt under the Act’s provisions), to
purchase “minimum essential”117 health coverage. Those who did not
comply with the mandate were assessed a “shared responsibility”118
payment, which the statute described as a “penalty[.]”119 The penalty was
calculated at two-and-a-half percent of an individual’s household income.120
Writing for the majority, Justice Roberts surprised many legal
commentators when he declared the penalty to be a permissible tax under
Article I, Section 8.121 The Chief Justice’s opinion was based on the
principle that, even where Congress uses a particular term in a statute, the
Court can construe that term differently if an alternative interpretation is
“fairly possible” to “save a statute from unconstitutionality.”122 Although
Justice Roberts’ opinion was supported by relevant precedent, it appears that
he was rightly concerned about the Supreme Court’s institutional integrity.
As one commentator explained, “Chief Justice Roberts invoked . . . the
principle that questions of policy are for Congress and not the courts to
determine.”123
112

132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
Id. at 2601.
114
Wilson Huhn, Realism Over Formalism and the Presumption of Constitutionality: Chief Justice
Roberts’ Opinion Upholding the Individual Mandate, 46 AKRON L. REV. 117, 133–134 (2013).
115
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2580.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
See Randy E. Barnett, No Small Feat: Who Won the Health Care Case (and why did so many
Law Professors Miss the Boat)?, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1331, 1336 (2013).
122
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2566 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932); Hooper v.
California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895)).
123
Huhn, supra note 114, at 131.
113
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Tellingly, however, Chief Justice Roberts also held that the Act
could not be supported by the Commerce Clause,124 an area where the Court
had traditionally accorded Congress substantial latitude.125 The Chief
Justice seemed to do what this Article is suggesting: restore equilibrium by
deferring to the legislative and executive branches’ decisions on issues of
policy, but set boundaries on Congressional authority where it upsets the
federalist balance.126 In fact, the Chief Justice’s opinion speaks to
institutional restraint and a modest judicial temperament that seeks to
facilitate effective democratic governance:
“Proper respect for a coordinate branch of the government”
requires that we strike down an Act of Congress only if “the
lack of constitutional authority to pass [the] act in question
is clearly demonstrated.” Members of this Court are vested
with the authority to interpret the law; we possess neither
the expertise nor the prerogative to make policy judgments.
Those decisions are entrusted to our Nation’s elected
leaders, who can be thrown out of office if the people
disagree with them. It is not our job to protect the people
from the consequences of their political choices.127
Unlike the Court’s decisions in Clinton and Citizens United, Justice
Roberts “rejected formalism and embraced realism in constitutional
analysis[.]”128 Justice Roberts may very well have thought the Affordable
Health Care Act was unconstitutional, but his decision protected something
more important than his own desires: the trappings of the Court’s dishonest
excesses. “Competitive federalism,”129 not ethereal notions of liberty, is
how meaningful change happens in a democratic society.
Likewise, in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, the
Court upheld an amendment to the Michigan Constitution that banned
public universities from considering race in the admissions process.130
124

Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2590 (“The proposition that Congress may dictate the conduct of an
individual today because of prophesied future activity finds no support in our precedent. . . . [W]e have
never permitted Congress to anticipate that activity itself in order to regulate individuals not currently
engaged in commerce.”).
125
See, e.g., Craig L. Jackson, The Limiting Principle Strategy and Challenges to the New Deal
Commerce Clause, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 11, 40 (2012) (“[T]he cases coming after and during the
Second New Deal established wide latitude for congressional action under the [Commerce] Clause.”).
126
Tellingly, however, Justice Roberts also held that the Act could not be supported by the
Commerce Clause, an area where the Court had traditionally accorded Congress substantial latitude. See
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2590 (“The proposition that Congress may dictate the conduct of an individual
today because of prophesied future activity finds no support in our precedent. . . . [W]e have never
permitted Congress to anticipate that activity itself in order to regulate individuals not currently engaged
in commerce.”); see also Jackson, supra note 125, at 40 (“[T]he cases coming after and during the
Second New Deal established wide latitude for congressional action under the [Commerce] Clause.”).
127
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2579 (citation omitted).
128
Huhn, supra note 114, at 135.
129
See id.
130
134 S. Ct. 1623, 1638 (2014).
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Writing for a three-member plurality, Justice Kennedy noted that the
decision was “not about how the debate about racial preferences should be
resolved . . . [but] about who may resolve it.”131 Kennedy also emphasized
“the significance of a dialogue regarding this contested and complex policy
question among and within states.”132
Of course, while reasonable people might disagree with the decision
of Michigan’s voters, the Constitution does not authorize the judiciary to
nullify the votes of millions based on a mere disagreement, just as it does
not prohibit another state from adopting policies that incorporate race in the
university admissions process. Allowing states to be different, and to
experiment with different policies, is the essence of a democracy that values
self-governance over centralized governance.
C. Equilibrium in the Democratic Sphere: The Penumbra Problem and Why
a Text-Based Justification is Necessary
Unlike its decisions relating to the political process, the Court has
not hesitated to view the Constitution as a living document where matters of
individual rights are concerned. In Griswold, the Court invalidated a
Connecticut law that prohibited the use of contraceptives.133 Justice
Douglas’ majority opinion did not hold that the statute violated a specific
provision in the Bill of Rights. Instead, he delved “between the lines”134 to
suggest that “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance.”135 One aspect of these penumbras was a “zone of privacy”136
within “the marriage relationship[,]”137 which rendered the law
unconstitutional.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Black expressed doubts about the
wisdom of Connecticut’s statute. His opinion, however, expressed grave
concerns over what he believed was the majority’s brazen use of judicial
power. As Justice Black explained, “I feel constrained to add that the law is
every bit as offensive to me as it my Brethren of the majority . . . who,
reciting reasons why it is offensive to them, hold it unconstitutional.”138
Furthermore, the majority’s reliance on the Due Process Clause and the
Ninth Amendment, “turn out to be the same thing—merely using different
words to claim for this Court and the federal judiciary power to invalidate
any legislative act which the judges find irrational, unreasonable or
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 1630.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
Amar, supra note 63, at 203 (discussing the Constitution’s “holistic between-the-lines meaning”).
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 486.
Id. at 507 (Black, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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offensive.”139 This “formula or doctrine or whatnot . . . takes away from
Congress and States the power to make laws based on their own judgment of
fairness and wisdom[,] . . . a power which was specifically denied federal
courts by the convention that framed the Constitution.”140 As Justice Black
stated, “I like my privacy as much as the next one, but I am nevertheless
compelled to admit that government has a right to invade it unless
prohibited by some specific constitutional provision.”141 The Constitution
does not give “blanket power to courts to exercise such a supervisory veto
over the wisdom and value of legislative policies and to hold
unconstitutional those laws which they believe unwise or dangerous.”142
Nowhere in the Bill of Rights—viewing each clause independently
or as a unified whole—was there a textual basis to strike the Connecticut
statute. Admittedly, the statute was unwise, even foolish, but it was not
unconstitutional. As such, the Court invented penumbras to provide a
source from which it could create the right itself, and therefore justify the
outcome. In doing so, however, the Court implicitly acknowledged that no
reasonable interpretation of the Constitution’s text could support its
decision. It also marked a new era of normative jurisprudence where the
ends justified the means, and the Constitution, in some cases, was viewed as
an obstacle to, not a constraint on, the Court’s power.
To be clear, the Constitution does have unwritten purposes, and the
meaning of ambiguous words like “cruel and unusual punishment” certainly
evolve over time. Of those unwritten guarantees, liberty, equality, and
autonomy evidence a constitutional vision of de-centralization, from which
emanates an individual and collective right to resolve constitutional
ambiguities through reasoned discourse.143 When the people cannot define
for themselves the laws to which they must adhere, then self-governance is
replaced by top-down governance that conflates what the law is144 and
should be, 145 and leads to dishonest decisions that replace democracy with
oligarchy. Dishonest decisions make any constitutional theory—liberal or
conservative—vulnerable to judicial impulse, and provide no sanctuary to
those who think the winds of judicial favor will always blow in their
direction. In short, Griswold made the “should” mistake, as did Justice
Kennedy when he declared that the Court must ask itself “what the law

139

Id. at 511.
Id. at 513.
141
Id. at 510.
142
Id. at 512.
143
See generally Cass. R. Sunstein, Liberal Constitutionalism and Liberal Justice, 72 TEX. L. REV.
305, 12 (1993) (explaining that any “theory of constitutional interpretation that amounted to a full-blown
theory of just outcomes would offer inadequate room for democratic rule, at least if that theory did not
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Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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should be.”146
Without a reasonable textual hook, nine unelected and life-tenured
judges can decide issues based on little more than subjective values and
individual policy preferences, and manipulate the Constitution to give a
decision the appearance of legitimacy. Nowhere was dishonesty more
evident than in Roe, where the Court made, at best, a perfunctory to ground
its decision in the Constitution.
1. Roe v. Wade
In Roe, the Court held that two statutes prohibiting abortion except
to save the mother’s life violated the Constitution’s unwritten mandates.147
Despite acknowledging that “[t]he Constitution does not explicitly mention
any right of privacy,”148 the majority noted that “the Court has recognized
that a right of personal privacy . . . or zones of privacy, does exist under the
Constitution.”149 As Justice Blackmun stated, “[i]n varying contexts, the
Court or individual Justices have . . . found at least the roots of that right . . .
in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights[.]”150 Relying solely on its own
inventions, that Court summarily declared that “[t]his right of privacy,
whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal
liberty . . . [or] in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of right to the people,
is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision to terminate her
pregnancy.”151
The Court was apparently unconcerned with, even
dismissive of, finding a legitimate textual hook in the Constitution.
Its sweeping conclusion failed to mention that “liberty is not
guaranteed absolutely against deprivation, only against deprivation without
due process of law.”152 Even supporters of abortion rights acknowledge that
Roe was not grounded in any defensible part of the Constitution. Harvard
law professor Lawrence Tribe states, “[o]ne of the most curious things about
Roe is that, behind its own verbal smokescreen, the substantive judgment on
which it rests is nowhere to be found.”153 Likewise, John Hart Ely explains
that Roe is “bad constitutional law, or rather . . . it is not constitutional law
and gives almost no sense of an obligation to try to be.”154
146

Id.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 164–166 (1973) (outlining a three-tiered approach to a woman’s right
to terminate a pregnancy, which was free from state regulation prior to viability).
148
Id. at 152.
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
Id. at 153.
152
Id. at 173 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Tribe, supra note 39, at 7; see also John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe
v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 947 (1973) (“[Roe v. Wade] is bad because it is bad constitutional law, or
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(emphasis in original).
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According to Archibald Cox, former U.S. Solicitor General,
“[n]either historian, layman, nor lawyer will be persuaded that all the details
prescribed in Roe v. Wade [by Justice Blackmun] are part of . . . the
Constitution.”155 As Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg explained, “[h]eavyhanded judicial intervention (in the context of Roe) was difficult to justify
and appears to have provoked, not resolved, conflict.”156
It is not surprising that scholars continue to search for a textual basis
to justify Roe as a matter of constitutional law.157 If the Court made the
correct decision in either Roe or Griswold, individual citizens would have
properly directed their vitriol at state legislatures for enacting such
improvident laws. Democracy allows you to correct dumb laws, but you
cannot fix bad decisions by a Court that answers to no one. That is why
Roe’s creation of an abortion right actually made that right less secure.
Almost twenty years later, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court had an opportunity to rectify this mistake.
Their decision, however, only re-enforced the belief that the Justices were
acting outside of their constitutional authority.
2. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey
In Planned Parenthood,158 the Court was squarely presented with
the decision of whether to overrule or affirm Roe. It did neither. Instead,
the Court applied stare decisis to uphold some aspects of Roe, while
simultaneously abandoning stare decisis to reject others. The statute in
question required, among other things, that a woman get informed consent159
prior to having an abortion160 and the Court re-affirmed Roe’s central
holding that gave women the choice to terminate a pregnancy. The majority
rejected Roe’s trimester framework, however, in favor of a test prohibiting
all state laws that unduly burdened a woman’s right to seek an abortion.161
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy stated that statutes
prohibiting abortion infringed on the “the heart of liberty[,]”162 as contained
in the Fourteenth Amendment, which it defined as “the right to define one's
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life.”163
155
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As the Court stated, “[t]he controlling word . . . before us is
‘liberty.’”164 The Due Process Clause, however, declares that no State shall
“deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.”165 The majority conceded that “a literal reading of the Clause might
suggest that it governs only the procedures by which a State may deprive
persons of liberty,”166 but it evaded this textual hurdle by stating that “the
Clause has been understood to contain a substantive component[.]”167
Andrew T. Hyman explains as follows:
The Court now regularly uses the Due Process Clause to
override laws enacted by elected representatives, thereby
eliminating various liberties of some people if those
liberties conflict with unenumerated “fundamental” rights of
other people. The Court accomplishes this deprivation
without relying upon any applicable law, except the Due
Process Clause itself. This subjectivistic doctrine of due
process has turned John Jay's “cornerstone” into wax.168
In his dissent, Justice Scalia properly recognized that the Court’s
desire to effectuate a “‘settlement’ of a divisive issue, a jurisprudential
Peace of Westphalia that is worth preserving, is nothing less than
Orwellian[,]”169 and proof that “[t]he Imperial Judiciary lives.”170
In Lawrence, Justice Kennedy again wrote for the majority and
invoked sweeping rhetoric about liberty, and conspicuously omitted a
principled discussion of the equal protection clause, leaving the rights of
same-sex couples suspended in a cloud of uncertainty.
3. Lawrence v. Texas
In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court properly invalidated a Texas statute
that prohibited “deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the
same sex.”171 Apart from the fact that this law was “uncommonly silly[,]”172
its application only to same-sex conduct, by any reasonable construction,
violated the Equal Protection Clause.173 Relying on Griswold and Planned
164

Id. at 846.
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Id. at 995 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 581 (2003).
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Id. at 605 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527 (1965)
(Stewart, J., dissenting)).
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Parenthood, however, Justice Kennedy based the majority’s opinion on a
violation of the Appellants’ “liberty” interests.174 As in Griswold, the
majority opinion was uninterested in finding a textual hook to anchor its
decision, which was surprising given that the Equal Protection Clause
provided ample authority to strike the statute. 175 Instead, Justice Kennedy
discussed liberty “both in its spatial and in its more transcendent
dimensions.”176
The majority eschewed reliance on history and tradition,177 except
for precedent in the past half century which, according to Justice Kennedy,
showed an “emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection”178
to adults in matters of private sexual conduct. Justice Kennedy also relied
on foreign law to support his reasoning, claiming that the Constitution’s
drafters “knew times can blind us to certain truths . . . .”179 In Justice
Kennedy’s view, “[a]s the Constitution endures, persons in every generation
can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom.”180 Justice
Kennedy’s reasoning was not surprising given his view that, although “one
can assume that any certain or fundamental rights should exist in any just
society[,]”181 it does not mean that “each of those essential rights is one that
we, as judges, can enforce under the written Constitution.”182
The majority opinion ignored Washington v. Glucksberg,183 which
held that the Fourteenth Amendment protects fundamental rights only to the
extent that they are “deeply rooted in this nation’s history and tradition[.]”184
Such rights are “‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ such that
‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed.’”185 This
standard was intended to guard against judicial overreaching:
We “have always been reluctant to expand the concept of
substantive due process because guideposts for responsible
decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and
open-ended.” By extending constitutional protection to an
174
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asserted right or liberty interest, we, to a great extent, place
the matter outside the arena of public debate and legislative
action. We must therefore “exercise the utmost care
whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field,”
lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be
subtly transformed into the policy preferences of the
Members of this Court.186
A “‘careful description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty
interest”187 is required because it “tends to rein in the subjective elements
that are necessarily present in due-process judicial review.”188 The modest
view adopted by the Glucksberg Court allows legislative bodies to debate
moral and social issues, “as it should in a democratic society.”189
Thus, while Lawrence reached the correct result—any law
prohibiting a particular group from engaging in particular sexual conduct is
inexcusably discriminatory—its rationale epitomized judicial arrogance. In
both style and substance, Lawrence provided judges with an unchecked
license to interpret constitutional questions based on the vagaries of modern
ethos, which turned the Constitution’s text—and its democratic governance
structure—into a necessary evil that could be discarded at the judiciary’s
whim.
Justice Kennedy has, at times, been at the vanguard of this
disturbing trend. As law professor and commentator Jeffrey Rosen explains,
“[h]e thinks that great judges, like great literary figures, have both the power
and the duty to [in Kennedy’s own words] ‘impose order on a disordered
reality[.]’”190 During a speech to the Kennedy Center in Washington, D.C.,
Justice Kennedy stated as follows:
“You know, in any given year, we may make more
important decisions than the legislative branch does—
precluding foreign affairs, perhaps,” he said. “Important in
the sense that it will control the direction of society.” When
asked to name the most important qualities for achievement
in his field, he replied: “To have an understanding that you
have an opportunity to shape the destiny of the country.191
This passage supports one scholar’s view that Kennedy is “the
186
Id. at 720 (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)) (citing Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977)).
187
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721(quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).
188
Id. at 721–22 (the “guideposts for responsible decisionmaking” were intended to “direct and
restrain our exposition of the Due Process Clause”).
189
Id. at 735.
190
Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Leader: The Arrogance of Anthony Kennedy, NEW REPUBLIC (June 16,
2007), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/supreme-leader-the-arrogance-anthony-kennedy.
191
Id.
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Court’s most vocal defender of judicial power.”192 It also explains Justice
Kennedy’s adherence to the Constitution’s text in Clinton, and his
unanchored language in Lawrence. Professor Lund explains that, “it should
be no surprise that some Justices have simply assumed that the Constitution
must include a provision that gives them the discretionary power to impose
their personal visions of justice and what they think of as the more
transcendent dementions of liberty.”193
As Professor Rosen explains, Justice Kennedy’s “self-dramatizing
utopianism”194 reflects the view that “it is the role of the Court in general
and himself in particular to align the messy reality of American life with an
inspiring and highly abstracted set of ideals.”195 By forcing legislatures and
citizens “to respect a series of moralistic abstractions about liberty, equality,
and dignity, judges, he believes, can create a national consensus about
American values that will usher in what he calls ‘the golden age of
peace.’”196
The glaring problem with Justice Kennedy’s opinions, which “are
full of Manichean platitudes about liberty and equality that acknowledge no
uncertainty[,]”197 is that his version of liberty is hauntingly anti-democratic,
and thus is not liberty at all. The words of Oliver Wendell Holmes bear
particular relevance:
I think that the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is
perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a
dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and
fair man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed
would infringe fundamental principles as they have been
understood by the traditions of our people and our law.198
Justice Kennedy’s “liberty” might be palatable to those who agree
with the outcomes he reaches, but the real—and lasting—legacy of Justice
Kennedy is that he is singlehandedly concentrating power in a set of
unelected judges. This judiciary’s role will be troubling if the next president
nominates someone like Alabama Supreme Court Justice Roy Moore, who
erected a monument of the Ten Commandments inside a courthouse lobby
and defied a federal court’s order demanding its removal.
Simply stated, living constitutionalism allows judges to drift into the
sea of unaccountable oligarchy.
192
Jeffrey Rosen, An Enigmatic Court? Examining the Roberts Court as it Begins Year Three: The
Roberts Court & Executive Power, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 503, 508 (2008).
193
Lund & McGinnis, supra note 21, at 1603.
194
Rosen, supra note 190.
195
Id.
196
Id.
197
Id.
198
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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III. WHERE DOES THE COURT GO FROM HERE? BACK TO FOOTNOTE FOUR
In Hollingsworth v. Perry,199 the Court’s approach to cases in both
of these categories thrust it into an irreconcilable conundrum. The Court
confronted the question of whether California’s Proposition 8, which
restricted marriage to opposite sex couples, violated the Constitution’s Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses.200 It also granted certiorari to
consider whether the Petitioners, who were Proposition 8’s proponents, had
standing.201 The district court and Ninth Circuit had answered the latter
question in the affirmative.202
In a 5-4 decision, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit. Writing for
the majority, Chief Justice Roberts held that the Petitioners’ only interest in
having the district court’s order reversed was to vindicate the constitutional
validity of a “generally applicable California law.”203 Such a “generalized
grievance,”204 which only alleged “harm . . . to every citizen's interest in
proper application of the Constitution and laws,”205 failed to differentiate the
Petitioners from the “public at large[.]”206 As Justice Roberts explained, a
litigant must suffer an injury in a “personal and individual way[,]”207 such
that he has a “direct stake”208 in the outcome. Since the “petitioners have . .
. not suffered an injury in fact,”209 their claim did not qualify as an Article
III case or controversy.
As with Sebelius, the Court’s decision may have been motivated by
other considerations. During oral argument, the Justices had deep concerns
about judicial overreaching. Justice Sonya Sotomayor asked Theodore
Olsen, the Respondent’s attorney, “[i]s there any way to decide this case in a
principled manner that is limited to California only?”210 Even Justice
Kennedy had reservations, stating that, “the problem with the case is that
you’re really asking, particularly because of the sociological evidence you
cite, for us to go into uncharted waters, and you can play with that metaphor,
there’s a wonderful destination, it is a cliff.”211 Justice Kennedy went so far
199
133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). Hollingsworth was heard together with United States v. Windsor, 133 S.
Ct. 2675 (2013), which challenged the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). In a 54 decision, the Court, per Justice Kennedy, ruled that DOMA was unconstitutional. Id. at 2682.
200
Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2659–60.
201
Id. at 2661. State officials had refused to defend Proposition 8, prompting the proponents of
Proposition 8 to intervene and defend its constitutionality. Id. at 2660.
202
Id. at 2660–2661.
203
Id. at 2662.
204
Id.
205
Id.
206
Id. (citations omitted).
207
Id. (citation omitted).
208
Id. (citation omitted).
209
Id. at 2664.
210
Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144),
http://supremecourt.gov.oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-144a.pdf.
211
Id.
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as to say, “I just wonder if—if the case was properly granted.”212 Justice
Samuel Alito noted that “[s]ame-sex marriage is very new[,]”213 and “[o]n a
question like that, of such fundamental importance, why should it not be left
for the people, either acting through initiatives and referendums or through
their elected public officials?”214
The Court had another problem, however, and it stemmed from its
own precedent. Since same-sex couples are not considered a “suspect
class,”215 laws differentiating on the basis of sexual orientation are subject to
the highly deferential rational basis review. As one commentator explains,
“courts applying traditional rational basis presume legislative legitimacy and
require only a superficial nexus between the state's regulatory means and
ends[.]”216 Thus, “[t]he assumptions underlying [a particular law] may be
erroneous, but the very fact that they are ‘arguable’ is sufficient . . . to
‘immunize’ the congressional choice from constitutional challenge.”217 It is
possible, although not certain, that restricting marriage to heterosexual
couples might have survived a constitutional attack. 218
Things get more complicated, though, because in recent years, the
Court has applied the rational basis “with bite” which “renders courts less
deferential to the legislature, less tolerant of over- or under-inclusive
classifications, and less open to state experimentation.”219 One commentator
characterized this test as “a muddled level of review where the Supreme
Court claims to be applying the rational basis [test] . . . but the reasoning
and results resemble the more exacting standard required by intermediate
scrutiny.”220 In addition, some lower courts have departed from the rational
212

Id. at 48.
Id. at 55.
214
Id. at 56.
215
Race, national origin, religion, and alienage are the only suspect classes. See, e.g., Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100–01(1943), and Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S 214, 216 (1944),
which means that discrimination on these grounds is subject to strict scrutiny, the most exacting form of
judicial scrutiny. Factors for deciding suspect-class status include: (1) prejudice against a discrete and
insular minority; (2) history of discrimination against the group; (3) the ability of the group to seek
political redress (i.e., political powerlessness); (4) the immutability of the group's defining trait; and (5)
the relevancy of that trait. See Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect Classifications, 35 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 135, 146 (2011).
216
Emma Freeman, Note, Giving Casey Its Bite Back: The Role of Rational Basis in Undue Burden
Analysis, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 279, 285 (2013).
217
FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 320 (1993).
218
See e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 5–6 (N.Y. 2006); see also Joseph W. Mintz, Note,
Same-Sex Marriage: New York Court of Appeals Denies Individuals the Ability to Marry Their Same-Sex
Partners, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 1431, 1437 (2007). Using rational basis review, the New York Court of
Appeals held that bans of same-sex marriage did not violate the state constitution’s due process and equal
protection clause. Mintz, supra, at 1435. The Court of Appeals found that “stability in the parenting
relationships” and “favor[ing] opposite-sex parents over same-sex parents,” were sufficient reasons to
justify the ban. Id. But see Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1096 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that the law did
not withstand even the highly-deferential rational basis review).
219
Freeman, supra note 216, at 285.
220
Julie A. Greenberg & Marybeth Herald, You Can’t Take It With You: Constitutional
Consequences of Interstate Gender-Identity Rulings, 80 WASH. L. REV. 819, 977 (2005). Intermediate
scrutiny applies to gender-based discrimination, and requires that a law: (1) advance important or
213
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basis test in any form and, where a law discriminates on the basis of sexual
orientation, applied “strict scrutiny.”221 A few courts have held that laws
against same-sex marriage are unconstitutional regardless of the scrutiny
level.222
Deciding Hollingsworth on the merits would have required the
Court’s to disentangle itself from this complex web. Whichever way it
ruled, however, the Court would likely have been accused of an
unprecedented act of judicial overreaching. Should the Court have held that
same-sex marriage bans withstood rational basis scrutiny, it would have
compromised the ongoing efforts of same-sex couples to effectuate
legislative change in the thirty-seven states that limit marriage to oppositesex couples. It would also have implicitly held that same-sex couples are
not a suspect class, which is a topic of dispute among several lower courts.
Invalidating same-sex marriage bans under the rational basis test, however,
would have left the Court vulnerable to claims that it was invading an area
traditionally reserved to the states, and acting with the same ad hoc
reasoning characteristic of Roe and Lawrence.
The Court could have declared homosexuals a suspect or quasisuspect class, but relevant precedent would have required it to deem
homosexuality, among other things, “an immutable characteristic.”223
Alternatively, the Court could have viewed same-sex marriage bans as
discrimination on the basis of gender, an issue which Justice Kennedy
claimed he was “trying to wrestle with[,]”224 and applied an intermediate
level of scrutiny.225 While this perspective is gaining some momentum
among courts and scholars, it pales in comparison to claims that these laws
violate the Equal Protection Clause.226 Ultimately, whichever way the Court
decided the merits of same-sex marriage, it would have faced precisely the
substantial government interests; (2) be substantially related to advancing those interests; and (3) not be
substantially more burdensome than necessary to advance those interests. See R. Randall Kelso,
Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Clause and Related Constitutional Doctrines
Protecting Individual Rights: The “Base Plus Six” Model and Modern Supreme Court Practice, 4 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 225, 234 (2012).
221
To pass constitutional muster under strict scrutiny, the state must demonstrate that a particular
law: (1) serves a compelling state interest; (2) is narrowly tailored to achieve that objective; and (3) is the
least restrictive means of achieving the asserted interest. See Matthew D. Bunker, Clay Calvert, &
William C. Nevin, Strict in Theory, but Feeble in Fact? First Amendment Strict Scrutiny and the
Protection of Speech, 16 COMM. L. & POL'Y 349, 356–57 (2011).
222
See e.g., Perry, 671 F.3d at 1096 (holding that Proposition 8 did not satisfy the rational basis
test); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 59–60 (1993) (holding that laws against same-sex marriage
discriminated on the basis of gender).
223
Emily K. Baxter, Note, Rationalizing Away Political Powerlessness: Equal Protection Analysis
of Laws Classifying Gays and Lesbians, 72 MO. L. REV. 891, 895–86 (2007).
224
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 210, at 13.
225
See, e.g., Baehr, 852 P.2d at 68.
226
Susan Frelich Appleton, Missing In Action? Searching for Gender Talk in the Same-Sex
Marriage Debate, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 97, 105 (2005) (“[W]hile most scholars commenting on
Bowers considered its implications for substantive due process or the level of scrutiny that gays and
lesbians can invoke under the Equal Protection Clause,” some scholars “revisited and revived the sex
discrimination argument that activists had made in the 1970s.”).
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type of criticism that, from his questions at oral argument, even Justice
Kennedy wanted to avoid.
That problem is traceable to Lawrence, where Justice Kennedy
spoke in vague generalities about liberty and did not confront the question
of whether homosexuals, as a class, warranted heightened scrutiny, or
whether the anti-sodomy law failed the rational basis test itself. In addition,
by relying on penumbra-like language and subjective definitions of liberty,
Justice Kennedy failed to ground same-sex couples’ undeniable right to
equality in the Constitution’s text. Thus, as in Roe, the Lawrence opinion
made the constitutional rights of same-sex couples uncertain and less
secure.227 This is precisely the type of “stealth constitutionalism”228 that
leads to confusion and, often, legislative stagnation. After Lawrence, few
except Justice Scalia, who assured us that the Court was laying the
foundation for a future ruling invalidating same-sex marriage bans,229 knew
what Lawrence actually stood for, and what state legislatures could expect
from future rulings. That not only leads to inertia in the democratic process;
it also ensures that the Court retains the authority to decide how—and
when—same-sex couples’ “liberty” will be defined. This is not fair to those
on either side of this divisive issue.
This doctrinal confusion may have been part of the reason that the
Court dismissed Hollingsworth on the basis of standing. Resolving the
issues that Lawrence avoided would have forced the Court to decide
whether same-sex couples constituted a suspect class, whether same-sex
marriage bans violated the applicable level of scrutiny, and whether the
three-tiered paradigm reviewing legislative classifications itself made sense.
Regardless of how the Court resolved these issues, it would have likely
resulted in the perception that the Court was overstepping its authority and
prematurely removing yet another issue from democratic debate. Indeed,
although Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion for the Hollingsworth majority had
a legitimate constitutional foundation, it may have been fueled in part by
these concerns and, ultimately, the Court’s institutional legitimacy. The
opinion may have also reflected a concern that marriage equality, for the
moment, should be resolved through the democratic process. Moreover,
given the recent decisions in Sebelius and Schuette, it appears that the Court
is placing more emphasis on institutional restraint. Critically, however,
decisions such as Citizens United and McCutcheon make it difficult to
believe that the results from democratic debate will be based on equal and
227
See Eric Berger, Lawrence’s Stealth Constitutionalism and Same-Sex Marriage Litigation, 21
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765, 790–92 (2013).
228
Id. at 765.
229
Lisa K. Parshall, Redefining Due Process Analysis: Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and the Concept
of Emergent Rights, 69 Alb. L. Rev. 237, 264 (2006) (“[T]he suggestion that Justice Kennedy's Romer
and Lawrence opinions lay the groundwork for the recognition of same-sex marriage was most
compellingly presented by the dissenters . . . .”).
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open decision-making processes.
The Court’s cautious approach, however, was slightly misguided.
Lost in both Windsor and Hollingsworth was the opportunity to reach
democratic equilibrium through the equal protection clause. In Carolene
Products’ famous footnote four, Justice Stone suggested that there may be a
narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the
Constitution.” 230 In Windsor, proponents of DOMA could not provide the
Court with a rational reason justifying same-sex marriage bans. Justice
Kagan, for example, dismantled the procreation argument by pointing out
that the state did not prohibit sterile couples from marrying.231 As
evidenced, in part, by DOMA’s legislative history and the lack of any
logical justifications, the true basis was moral disapproval of homosexual
couples.
Justice Kennedy called it animus,232 but one need not go that far.
Enshrining inequality into the law on the basis on moral disapproval facially
violates the equal protection (and establishment) clause because it permits
the state to base unequal treatment on wholly subjective values. That is a
recipe for arbitrariness, and the sine qua non of a discrimination that no
constitution should tolerate. Unfortunately, Justice Kennedy’s failure to rely
more directly on equal protection principles in Planned Parenthood and
Lawrence left the Court with little more than high-handed dicta about liberty
and a swath of muddled precedent. It should come as no surprise, therefore,
that Windsor was authored by Justice Kennedy and again based on
undefinable generalities, while Hollingsworth was decided on standing.
In Windsor, Kennedy wrote that the “Constitution protects . . . moral
and sexual choices”233 and that DOMA was intended “disparage,” and
“injure,” same-sex couples.234 Chief Justice Roberts properly scolded
Kennedy for this language, stating that he would not “tar the political
branches with the brush of bigotry.”235 In Hollingsworth, however, the
Court could not nationalize same-sex marriage based on unanchored
pronouncements about liberty without risking permanent damage to its
institutional legitimacy—and democracy itself. But the Court could not
uphold DOMA without also appearing that it was, in fact, upholding the
constitutionality of state same-sex marriage bans.
230

United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
See Robin Abcarian, Prop. 8: Justice Kagan cuts to the Injustice of Gay Marriage Ban, L.A.
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United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013) (stating that the Defense of Marriage
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Id. at 2696.
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Id. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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This underscores the problem with normative judging. It creates a
doctrinal hole that “liberty” and substantive due process can only go so far
in filling. Eventually, no matter how desirable the outcome, the people will
demand that decisions removing an issue from democratic debate be
grounded in something more than personal predilection. In Windsor and
Hollingsworth, the Court had nothing to fall back on because the textual
hook that actually prohibits marriage inequality—the equal protection
clause—had been underused in Lawrence. The real failure of Roe, Planned
Parenthood, and Lawrence, therefore, is that it forces the Court to exercise
institutional restraint where none is necessary (as in Hollingsworth), while
also allowing the Court to manipulate the Constitution to achieve desirable
outcomes where restraint is unquestionably necessary. In the end, both
approaches leave people, whether it is women in Roe or same-sex couples in
Hollingsworth, wondering whether their rights are fundamental or political.
Put differently, invalidating same-sex marriage bans is consistent with
institutional restraint. Had the Court reached the same result in Lawrence
but, as Justice O’Connor suggested, based its decision on equal protection
principles, it would have had the doctrinal basis to invalidate same-sex
marriage bans in Hollingsworth.
And she was right. Absent a logical justification, discrimination is
unconstitutional. The Court’s three scrutiny levels, which adjust the
scrutiny level based on the legislative classification, is unnecessary. A law
is no less unconstitutional simply because it discriminates based on gender
rather than race, or on age rather than ethnicity. Any law that discriminates
without a logical justification should be struck down. The equal protection
clause does not necessarily guarantee equal outcomes for all citizens, but it
promises equal treatment.
Furthermore, equal treatment enhances
procedural and democratic equality because it empowers disenfranchised
groups and prevents majorities from enacting arbitrary legislation.
Equal protection is, therefore, a path to substantive rights protection
and institutional restraint. Substantive due process and penumbras,
however, are a license for judges to centralize democracy among nine
unelected lawyers. What the Court cannot do through the Constitution it
should never do through legal fictions and ad hoc rationalizations. Thus, the
Court should not invalidate laws where: (1) the Constitution is silent or its
terms are ambiguous; and (2) reasonable people can differ regarding
desirable policy outcomes. As discussed in Part II of this series, to restore
democratic equilibrium the Court should be more circumspect about
granting certiorari, expand the political question and justiciability doctrines,
and apply a single level of scrutiny in discrimination cases. Some “cases”
are not “controversies” at all, and should be left to the democratic process at
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the state and local levels.236
In his dissent, Justice Scalia, who has also authored some
questionable opinions,237 didn’t mince words:
In the majority's telling, this story is black-andwhite: Hate your neighbor or come along with us. The truth
is more complicated. It is hard to admit that one's political
opponents are not monsters, especially in a struggle like this
one, and the challenge in the end proves more than today's
Court can handle. Too bad. A reminder that disagreement
over something so fundamental as marriage can still be
politically legitimate would have been a fit task for what in
earlier times was called the judicial temperament. We
might have covered ourselves with honor today, by
promising all sides of this debate that it was theirs to settle
and that we would respect their resolution. We might have
let the People decide.
But that the majority will not do. Some will rejoice
in today's decision, and some will despair at it; that is the
nature of a controversy that matters so much to so many.
But the Court has cheated both sides, robbing the winners of
an honest victory, and the losers of the peace that comes
from a fair defeat. We owed both of them better. I
dissent.238
Justice Kennedy’s ends-justify-the-means ends rationale reflects
noble intentions, but yields undemocratic results. It also makes the
presidential election, not law, more important than written, unwritten, or
invisible constitutions. Same and opposite-sex couples, conservatives and
liberals, whatever those two words mean, have a social contract with the
government that gives them the power to define its unenumerated rights.
The Court should take heed from the relentless legislative attempts to gut
Roe: the people have opinions too, and they also act “with bite.”
IV. CONCLUSION
Judges matter, but citizens matter more. The penumbras are
important, but they’re not designed to replace words. The unwritten
Constitution is not supposed to clash, or stand alone, from the written one.
Liberty is neither secured nor vindicated when its commands come from the
236

Id. (“[T]his Court lacks jurisdiction to review the decisions of the courts below.”).
See e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia: A Critical Appraisal, 22
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top down. If Justice Kennedy honestly believes that “[t]he essence of
democracy is that the right to make law rests in the people and flows to the
government, not the other way around[,]”239 then his opinions should better
reflect that belief. Citizens deserve honest judges who believe in their right
to create the laws under which they are governed. Nothing is more free—or
equal—than a society where democracy expresses itself from the roots, not
from the skies.
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